dev.cocore.compute.attestation

{
  "$type": "com.atproto.lexicon.schema",
  "defs": {
    "main": {
      "key": "tid",
      "record": {
        "properties": {
          "attestedAt": {
            "format": "datetime",
            "type": "string"
          },
          "authenticatedRootEnabled": {
            "type": "boolean"
          },
          "binaryHash": {
            "description": "SHA-256 hex of the cocore-provider binary that produced this attestation.",
            "maxLength": 64,
            "minLength": 64,
            "type": "string"
          },
          "chipName": {
            "maxLength": 64,
            "type": "string"
          },
          "encryptionPubKey": {
            "description": "X25519 public key (base64) bound to the same Secure Enclave identity. Proves a single device controls both signing and request-encryption keys.",
            "maxLength": 128,
            "type": "string"
          },
          "expiresAt": {
            "description": "Receipts that strong-ref this attestation are only considered fresh if completedAt < expiresAt. Default 24h after attestedAt.",
            "format": "datetime",
            "type": "string"
          },
          "hardwareModel": {
            "description": "DMI string, e.g. 'Mac15,8'.",
            "maxLength": 64,
            "type": "string"
          },
          "mdaCertChain": {
            "description": "Optional Apple Managed Device Attestation certificate chain (DER), leaf first. Present when trustLevel is 'hardware-attested'. Verifiers MUST: (1) verify every adjacent link to the embedded Apple Enterprise Attestation Root CA, enforcing BasicConstraints (non-leaf certs are CAs, the leaf is an end-entity); and (2) require the leaf's P-256 public key to EQUAL this record's `publicKey` — i.e. the chain is BOUND to the receipt-signing key. Without (2) a valid Apple chain for one device could be stapled onto an unrelated signing key, so a chain that verifies but isn't bound MUST NOT earn 'hardware-attested'. Producers (the MDA provisioning tool) MUST therefore attest the signing key itself.",
            "items": {
              "maxLength": 8192,
              "type": "bytes"
            },
            "maxLength": 8,
            "type": "array"
          },
          "osVersion": {
            "maxLength": 64,
            "type": "string"
          },
          "publicKey": {
            "description": "P-256 public key (base64). MUST equal the attestationPubKey of the provider record under the signing DID.",
            "maxLength": 256,
            "type": "string"
          },
          "rdmaDisabled": {
            "type": "boolean"
          },
          "secureBootEnabled": {
            "type": "boolean"
          },
          "secureEnclaveAvailable": {
            "type": "boolean"
          },
          "selfSignature": {
            "description": "Secure Enclave P-256 signature (DER) over a sorted-key canonical JSON of every other field in this record. Verifiers MUST reconstruct the canonical JSON byte-for-byte before checking.",
            "maxLength": 256,
            "type": "bytes"
          },
          "serialNumberHash": {
            "description": "SHA-256 hex of (serialNumber || providerDID). Hashed so the public record never leaks raw serials. When an mdaCertChain is present, the serialNumber MUST be the one the verified MDA leaf attests (not a self-reported value), so the hashed device identity is anchored to the chain.",
            "maxLength": 64,
            "minLength": 64,
            "type": "string"
          },
          "sipEnabled": {
            "type": "boolean"
          }
        },
        "required": [
          "publicKey",
          "encryptionPubKey",
          "chipName",
          "hardwareModel",
          "serialNumberHash",
          "osVersion",
          "binaryHash",
          "sipEnabled",
          "secureBootEnabled",
          "secureEnclaveAvailable",
          "authenticatedRootEnabled",
          "selfSignature",
          "attestedAt",
          "expiresAt"
        ],
        "type": "object"
      },
      "type": "record"
    }
  },
  "description": "A snapshot of a provider machine's hardware and software state, signed by its Secure Enclave. Content-addressed: many receipts strong-ref the same attestation record until the underlying state changes (binary upgrade, OS update, key rotation).",
  "id": "dev.cocore.compute.attestation",
  "lexicon": 1
}