dev.cocore.compute.attestation

{
  "key": "tid",
  "type": "record",
  "record": {
    "type": "object",
    "required": [
      "publicKey",
      "encryptionPubKey",
      "chipName",
      "hardwareModel",
      "serialNumberHash",
      "osVersion",
      "binaryHash",
      "sipEnabled",
      "secureBootEnabled",
      "secureEnclaveAvailable",
      "authenticatedRootEnabled",
      "selfSignature",
      "attestedAt",
      "expiresAt"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "chipName": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 64
      },
      "expiresAt": {
        "type": "string",
        "format": "datetime",
        "description": "Receipts that strong-ref this attestation are only considered fresh if completedAt < expiresAt. Default 24h after attestedAt."
      },
      "osVersion": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 64
      },
      "publicKey": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 256,
        "description": "P-256 public key (base64). MUST equal the attestationPubKey of the provider record under the signing DID."
      },
      "attestedAt": {
        "type": "string",
        "format": "datetime"
      },
      "binaryHash": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 64,
        "minLength": 64,
        "description": "SHA-256 hex of the cocore-provider binary that produced this attestation."
      },
      "sipEnabled": {
        "type": "boolean"
      },
      "mdaCertChain": {
        "type": "array",
        "items": {
          "type": "bytes",
          "maxLength": 8192
        },
        "maxLength": 8,
        "description": "Optional Apple Managed Device Attestation certificate chain (DER), leaf first. Present when trustLevel is 'hardware-attested'. Verifiers MUST: (1) verify every adjacent link to the embedded Apple Enterprise Attestation Root CA, enforcing BasicConstraints (non-leaf certs are CAs, the leaf is an end-entity); and (2) require the leaf's P-256 public key to EQUAL this record's `publicKey` — i.e. the chain is BOUND to the receipt-signing key. Without (2) a valid Apple chain for one device could be stapled onto an unrelated signing key, so a chain that verifies but isn't bound MUST NOT earn 'hardware-attested'. Producers (the MDA provisioning tool) MUST therefore attest the signing key itself."
      },
      "rdmaDisabled": {
        "type": "boolean"
      },
      "hardwareModel": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 64,
        "description": "DMI string, e.g. 'Mac15,8'."
      },
      "selfSignature": {
        "type": "bytes",
        "maxLength": 256,
        "description": "Secure Enclave P-256 signature (DER) over a sorted-key canonical JSON of every other field in this record. Verifiers MUST reconstruct the canonical JSON byte-for-byte before checking."
      },
      "encryptionPubKey": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 128,
        "description": "X25519 public key (base64) bound to the same Secure Enclave identity. Proves a single device controls both signing and request-encryption keys."
      },
      "serialNumberHash": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 64,
        "minLength": 64,
        "description": "SHA-256 hex of (serialNumber || providerDID). Hashed so the public record never leaks raw serials. When an mdaCertChain is present, the serialNumber MUST be the one the verified MDA leaf attests (not a self-reported value), so the hashed device identity is anchored to the chain."
      },
      "secureBootEnabled": {
        "type": "boolean"
      },
      "secureEnclaveAvailable": {
        "type": "boolean"
      },
      "authenticatedRootEnabled": {
        "type": "boolean"
      }
    }
  }
}